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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF. THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16863

-vsFRANK VLACIL,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was convicted of violating Utah
Code Annotated § 76-10-503 which prohibits the possession
of a dangerous weapon by a person who is not a citizen of
the United States.

At the time of the incident forming the

basis of this case, the appellant was a Czechoslovakian
native found to have been in possession of a firearm ..
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged by information with the
commission of a third degree felony under U.C.A. § 76-10-503.
The appellant was convicted of violating the provisions of
this statute in a jury tria~ the Honorable Boyd Bunnell of
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the Seventh Judicial District in and
presiding.

~or

Carbon County,

Upon conviction, the appellant was sentenced

to serve a term of confinement in the Utah State Prison,
not to exceed £ive

years~

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an order and judgment upholding
the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 and
affirming the conviction in the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of February 21, 1979, James Cruz,
intent on an evening of drinking, and socializing, took a
taxi cab.to the Eagle's Club in Price, Utah (T.14).

As

Cruz and a group of friends arrived at the club, they noticed
another friend, the appellant, had already arrived (T.15).
Shortly thereafter, the appellant and Cruz engaged in a
heated discussion about the attendance and membership policy
of the club which refuses non-members entrance after the
third visit unless a commitment to join is made (T.15).
The appellant had visited the club on three occasions prior
to the evening of February 21, and was thus ineligible to
enter without membership (T.15).

The argument evolved into

a fight between the two men which ended when the appellant
was forcibly ejected from the club (T.16).

At approximately

12:30 a.m., Cruz and the group left the club and proceeded to
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a bar owned jointly by Cruz and Ann

A~chibald

(T.15,16).

Shortly after arriving at this bar, a bullet was fired
from the outside, through a window of the bar (T.19,20).
Patrons at the bar looked· outside and saw the appellant
holding a gun (T.20).

Cruz went outside in an attempt to

·calm the appellant (T. 2 0 ,25) .

As Cruz approached, the

appellant commanded him to stay away or he would kill him
(Cruz)

(T.28).

After the appellant jammed the gun several

times into Cruz's face (T.25), Cruz began to back away from
the appellant (T.25).

Cruz had backed approximately

fifteen feet from the appellant when he shot Cruz through
the shoulder (T.25).

Later, at approximately 2:00 a.m.,

the appellant was arrested as he was sitting in his van
(T.56,57).

As police officers looked through the driver's

side window of the van, the gun used in the previous shooting
was discovered and seized (T.57).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
STATE AND NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, GUARANTEE
COLLECTIVE RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
ALLOWING LEGISLATURES TO REGULATE THE POSSESSION OF ARMS PURSUANT TO TRADITIONAL STATE
POLICE POWERS.
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503 states in pertinent
part that:
(1) Any person who is not a citizen of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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United States, or any person who has been
convicted of any crime of violence under
the laws of the United States, the State
of Utah, ·or any other state, government,
or country, or who is addicted to the use
of any narcotic drug, or any person who
has been .declared mentally incompetent
shall not own or have in his possession or
under his custody or control any dangerous
weapon as defined in this part. Any person
who violates this .section is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous
weapon is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun,
he shall be guilty of a felony of the
third .degree.
The appellant, who was convicted of possession of a firearm
by a person who is not a citizen of the United States, alleges
that the above code section is violative of provisions of· the
state and national constitutions.

The Second Amendment to

the United States Constitution provides that, nA well-regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed."

Correspondingly, Article I Section 6 of the

Utah Constitution states: "The people have the right to bear
arms for their security and defense, but the Legislature
may regulate the exercise of this right by law."

In the

case of United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1938), the
United States Supreme Court addressed fears similar to those
expressed by the appellant in the case at bar.

·That case

concerned the National Firearms Act under which the appellant
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was convicted for transporting a saweq-off shotgun in
interstate commerce.

The Court examined the historical

foundation of the Second Amendment and stated:
The Constitut~on as originally adopted
granted to the Congress power-"To provide
for calling forth the Militia to execute
the Laws of the Unibn . . . ; To provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining,
the Militia, and for governing such part
of them as may be employed in the Service
of the United States, reserving to the
States respectively, the Appointment of
the Officers, and the Authority of training
the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress." With obvious
purpose to assure the continuation and
render possible the effectiveness of such
forces the declaration and guarantee of
the Second Amendment were made. It must
be interpreted and applied with that end
in view.
307 U.S. at 178.

In short, the Second Amendment right to

keep and bear arms refers directly to the states' right to
maintain a militia, but not to the right of an individual
to possess a firearm.

Such was the holding of the court

in Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971):
Since the Second Amendment right "to keep
and bear Arms" applies only to the right
of the State to maintain a militia and not
to the individual's right to bear arms,
there can be no serious claim to any express
constitutional right of an indiv~dual to
possess a firearm.
·At 149.

Accordingly, the courts have come to a general

concensus that the Second Amendment guarantees a collective
rather than an individual right.

United States v. Warin,
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530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976), cer.t. den. 426

u.s .

948.

Likewi.se, state courts when dealing with claims
of unconstitutional gun control statutes, apply the
Second Amendment in a manner similar to federal courts ..
In Harris v. State, 432 P.2d 929 (Nev. 1967)_, the court
stated, referring to the Second Amendment's application
to the Nevada gun control law:

"That the amendment applies

only to the Federal Government and does not restrict state
action • • • The right to bear arms does not apply to
private citizens as an individual right."

At 930.

Similarly, the c,ourt in Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d
847, 850 (Mass. 1976) again, referring to the Second
Amendment stated:
The chances appear remote that this amendment
will ultimately be read to control the States,
for unlike some other provisions of the bill
of rights, this is not directed to guaranteeing
the rights of individuals, but rather, as we
have said, to assuring some freedom of the
State forces from national interference.
The underlying basis for holding that the Second
Amendment allows restrictions to be placed on the possession
of firearms by individuals, can be traced to the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution: "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the p~ople. "

Under this amendment, the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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states have the power to enact laws appropriate for
protecting the health and welfare of the people.

This

general police power allows the state to legislate in
the field of gun control.

In People v. Garcia, 595 P.2d

228, 230 (Colo. 1979), the Colorado Supreme Court stated,
"The right to bear arms is not absolute, and it can be
restricted by the state's valid exercise of its police
power."

Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court in Hardison v.

State, 437 P.2d 868, 871 (Nev. 1968) noted, "[T]he Second
Amendment right is not absolute.

The provision only applies

to the federal government, and absent federal or state
constitutional restraints the authority to regulate weapons
comes from a state's police powers.

This is a valid subject

for state regulation."
A similar holding is appropriate in the present
case.

Pursuant to Article I Section 6 of the Utah Constitution,

"The people have the right to bear arms for their security
and defense, but the Legislature may regulate the exercise
of this right by law."

The Utah Code section 76-10-503 is

simply a manifestation of the Legislature exercising its
right, pursuant to the state constitution, to regulate the
people's right to bear arms.

There is no question that

the Legislature had the power and right to enact Utah Code
Ann. 76-10-503.

State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813, 814
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(Utah 1974).

In address_ing a Fourteenth Amendment equal

protection attack on the statute involved here, this
Court stated:

"The sale, use and possession of firearms

are proper -subjects of regulation by the State.

The

Fourteenth Amendment is not generally applied so as to
restrict the exercise of police powers by the state."
This Court concluded its analysis of the issues by holding:
The statute under consideration was directed
toward the safeguarding of the public peace
and security and is thus a proper exercise
of the police powers. It appears that the
legislature determined that the possession
of firearms by-aliens was harmful, and we
do not quarrel with the decision of that
body.
At 815.

Thus, not only is the disputed statute a constitutional

exercise of the state's police powers, but where such powers
of regulation are expressly granted to the legislature by
the state constitution, this Court has given great deference
to the decision of that body.

Therefore, the Court's

decision in the case at bar should support and follow the
precedent of State v. Beorchia, supra.
The appellant distinguishes the present statute
from similarly drawn statutes on the premise that the instant
statute

"prohibit~"

of firearms.

rather than "regulates" the possession

Such a distinction is, however, invalid when

contrasted against the nature of provisions guaranteeing the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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right to bear arms.

These provisions'· as previ.ously

stated, confer a collective right only; no individual
rights are involved.

Therefore, only a statute which

makes a collective prohib.ition may be characteri.zed as
absolutely prohibiting possession of firearms.

Were

this not so, a statute prohibiting the possession of
firearms by persons convicted of felonies (also a class
of individuals) , would contain the same potential
constitutional infirmity advocated by the appellant in
the present case.

However, statutes prohibiting the

possession of firearms by felons have been unanimously
upheld as a valid exercise of state police powers.

Since

the present statute does not collectively prohibit the
possession of firearms by the people of this state, the
appellant's attack must be rejected.
The appellant assails the instant statute on the
ground that cases cited by this Court in Beorchia dealt
with statutes promulgating qualified prohibitions, i.e.,
aliens are prohibited from possessing firearms except in
situations of individual self-defense.

It should be noted

that this Court did not rely upon Ex Parte Rameriz, 226
P. 914 (Cal. 1924) and Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S.
138 (1915) , for the entire rationale of the Beorchia
opinion; rather these two cases are cited to support the
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proposition that a statute such as Utah Code Ann. § 76-10503 which is directed toward the safeguarding of the public
peace and security, is the proper exercise 0£ the police
powers.

530 P.2d at 815.

Since the above cases were noted

for the general proposition that statutes addressed to
safeguarding the public peace and security are a valid
exercise 0£ police powers to which Fourteenth Amendment
restrictions are generally not applied, the superficial
legal distinction mentioned by appellant is not sufficient
to compel a result contrary to Beorchia.
In the event that a self-defense distinction were
valid in the present case, the appellant still could not
prevail since self-defense was not involved here.

In

other words, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 is not unconstitutiona:
as applied to the appellant since the incident which
precipitated the arrest, the shooting of Cruz, was not an
act of self-defense.

Although, after the first shot through

the window of the bar, Cruz left the bar and approached the
appellant to calm him down, the appellant shot Cruz as Cruz
was backing away from the appellant (T. 25, 30 ,48) •

Therefore,

even if the possession of a firearm by an alien should be
allowed under the· Utah Code for purposes of self-defense,
the statute was constitutionally applied to the appellant.
He has no standina to assert a cause based on the prosecution
;.)

of an alien under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 who may have
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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peacefully or justifiably used or possessed a firearm.

POINT II
STATE LAWS WHICH AFFECT ALIENS BY
REGULATING THEIR USE AND POSSESSION
OF FIREARMS, ARE NOT PREEMPTED BY
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION SINCE SUCH
REGULATIONS DO NOT IMPINGE ON
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION.
The appellant asserts that since Utah Code Ann.
§

76-10-503 a:ffects or in some way regulates the activities

of resident aliens, it is preempted under the Supremacy Clause
of Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.
The assertion continues that Congress has preempted the
entire field of alien regulation, making any state regulations
invalid.
logic.

Appellant's

rea~oning

is .unsupported by case law

~r

Appellant recognizes that it is only in the field of

immigration and naturali21.ation that federal law dominates,
but fails to demonstrate any nexus between immigration and
naturalization and the type of regulation involved here.
Simply stated, the prohibition against the possession of
firearms by aliens has nothing to do with, nor does it
affirmatively or negatively impinge upon the federal regulations concerning the immigration, naturalization, or
registration of aliens.

An examination of the law in this

area reveals several standards used by the courts to
determine whether state regulations are preempted by
federal legislation.

In Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul,

373 U.S. 132 (1962), the Court enumerated these standards:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(1) a state regulation is preempted

wh~re

an unambiguous

congressional mandate exists to that effect;
'

(2) preemption

exists where the state regulation cannot be enforced
without impairing federal superintedence of the field;
and (3) preemption of the state regulation exists where it
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes of

Congress~

Under any of these

standards, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 is a proper exercise
of this state's police powers and is not preempted by
federal legislation.
No unambiguous congressional mandate exists to
preclude a state from regulating the possession of firearms
by aliens; certainly the appellant has made no such showing.
The appellant refers to 18

~.S.C.App.

§

1201-1203 (which is

attached at the end of respondent's brief) in an attempt to
make the requisite showing of an unambiguous congressional
mandate.

However, the language contained in these sections

does not ·satisfy the "clearly unambiguous" standard directed
at the states. ·

218

(i.e., in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator c-orp., 331 t

(1946), the Court held that an examination of the legislati~

history of Section 29 of the United States Warehouse Act,
7 U.S.C.

§

241, et- seq., combined with language stating:

"[T]he power, jurisdiction, and authority conferred upon the
Secretary of Agriculture under this Act shall be exclusive. ·
was sufficiently unambiguous to meet the Court's preemption
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
requirements.)
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federal statute was not directed at the ownership of
firearms, but at the possession of firearms.
Rec. 14, 773-75 (1968).

114 Cong.

The Utah statute addresses the

issue of ownership as well as possession.

Moreover, the

provisions were viewed in general as, "[N]ecessary to a
coorindated attack on crime and also a good compliment to the
gun-control legislation contained in title IV of this bill."

114 Cong. Rec. 16,286 (1968).

In sum, Congress has not

provided the mandate necessary to restrict regulation,
but rather has provided a regulatory basis for gun control
in general which compliments existing state regulation.
The appellant similarly fails to show that
enforcement of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-10-503 impairs the

enforcement of federal gun control laws or any immigration
and naturalization requirements.

Concerning this test,

the Court in Florida Avocado Growers stated:

"The test of

whether both federal and state regulations may operate,
or the state regulation must give way, is whether both
regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal
superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed
at similar or different objectives."

373 U.S. at 142.

This

authority is directly contrary to the appellant's unsupported
assertion that, because 18 U.S.C. App.

§ 1201 contains

restrictions on the possession of firearms, state regulation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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in the same area must give way.

Since enforcement of

Section 76-10-503 in no way impairs federal irrnnigration
and naturalization regulations, or federal gun control
laws, the Utah state cannot be deemed to have been
preempted.
Likewise, the Utah statute does not stand as
an obstacle to the purposes of Congress in the area of
immigration and naturalization.

In the case at bar,

there is no reason to believe that irrnnigration will be
discouraged or hindered by Utah Code Ann.

§

76-10-503.

There is no state registratlon requirement as in
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), there is no
burden on the employment of aliens as in Takahashi v.
Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), nor is there
any other obstacle to the federal purpose of promoting
immigration and naturalization.

Consequently, under any

of the standards presently utilized to examine preemption,
the propriety of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-10-503 must be upheld.

This conclusion is consistent with the re·sult in the case
of DeCanas

v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).

There the

Court upheld the constitutionality of a state stauute which
prohibited an employer from knowingly employing an alien
who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States
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if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful
resident workers.

In response to the argument that the

state statute was preempted by the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8

u.s.c.·

§

1101, et seq., the Court stated:

"But the Court has never held that every state enactment
which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of
immigration and thus per se preempted by this constitutional
power, whether latent or exercised."

424 U.S. at 355.

The

Court continued by stating that, "[S]tanding alone, the fact
that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render
it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a
determination of who should or should not be admitted to the
country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may
remain."

Id. at 355.

The Colorado Supreme Court found this

language equally applicable to a statute which prohibited
resident aliens from voting in school board elections.
In Skafte v. Rorex,

553 P.2d 830, 834 (Colo. 1976), the court

noted that voter qualification was a primary example of an
area which the states have historically occupied.

Finding

no conflict between the state statute and the Immigration and
Nationality Act, and no congressional intent to remove power
from the states in this area, the court concluded that only
a demonstration that a complete ouster of state power was

-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the clear and manifest purpose of Congress, would require
a conclusion of preemption.

533 P.2d at 834.

Correspondingly,

in the area of the exercise of state police power, the
appellant has made no demonstration of congressional intent
to completely eliminate the power of the state to regulate
the ownership and possession of firearms by aliens.

Utah

Code Ann. § 76-10-503 has not been preempted and its
application in this case should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The appellant's conviction under Utah Code Ann.
§

76-10-503 was proper and should be affimred.

The appellant

has failed to overcome the authority of this Court's decision
in State v. Beorchia, as well as the authority of other courts
which have upheld similar state laws prohibiting the possession
or ownership of deadly weapons by aliens.

See People v.

Cannizzaro, 31 P.2d 1066 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934); People v.
Cordero, 122 P.2d 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942); and People v.
Mendoza, 60 Cal.Rptr. 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). (all construing
a California law which was eventually repealed by the
California legislature).
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I Section 6 of the Utah Constitution confer only
collective rights ·of firearm ownership and possession relating
to the state's power to maintain a militia.

Arguments that thes

provisions support the appellant's individual right of possess~
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and ownership have been overwhlemingly· rejected by the courts.
Furthermore since the appellant has failed to show
congressional intent to eliminate state regulatory powers
in the area of gun control through the Inunigration and
Nationality Act, the state statute here involved is not
preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR RECEIPT OF FIREARMS
· Pub. L. 90-351, title VII, §§ 1201-1203, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 236, as amended
TITLE REFERRED TO Di D.C. CoDE
Title vn of Pub. L. 90-351 is referred to in section 6-1802 of the District of Columbia Code
§ 1201. Congressional findings and declaration

Tne Congr~ hereby finds and declares that
the receipt, possession, or transportation of a
firearm by felons. veterans who are discharged
under dishonorable conditions, mental incomoetents, aliens who are illegally in the country.
former citizens who have renounced their
citizenship, constitutesCl) a burden on commerce or threat affecting the free !low of commerce.
C2) a threat to the safety of the President of
the United States and Vice President of the
United States,
C3) an impediment or a threat to the exerci.ise of free speech and the free exercise of a
religion guaranteed by the first amendment
to the Constitution of the United States. and
(~) a. threat to the continued and effective
operation of the Government of the United
States and of the government of ea.ch State
guaranteed by article IV of the Constitution.
<.As amended Pub. L. 90-618, title Ill.
§ 301<::.>Cl), Oct. 22. 1968, 82 Stat. 1236.)

and

.AME:h"DMENTS

1968-:?ub. L. 90-618 substituted "discharged under
dishonorable conditions" for "other than honorably
Cischarged".
En'EcTivE DATE OF 1968 .AMENDMENT

Section 302 of Pub. L. 90-618 provided that: "The
a.mendme-nts ma.de by paragraphs U> and C2) of subsection (&) of section 301 [amending this section and
section 1202Ca)C2), Cb><2> of this Appendix] shall take
efiect as of June 19, 1968.''

§ 1202. Receipt, possession, or transportation of fireP..ntlS

Persons liable; penalties·for violations
Any person who<1 > has been convicted by a court of the

(a)

United States or. of a State or any political
subdivision thereof of a felony, or
(2) has been discharged from the Armed
Forces mider dishonorable conditions, or
. C3) ha.> bee:n adjudged by a court of the
United States or of a State or any political
subdiVi.sion thereof of being mentally incom·
petent, or

C4) having been a ·citizen of the United
States ha.s renounced his citizenship. or
C5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully
in the United States,
and who receives, possesses, or tra.nspo~ in
commerce or affecting commerce, after the
date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
for not more than two yea.rs, or both.
(b) Employment; persons liable; penalties for viola·
tions
Any individual who to his knowledge and

while being employed by any person whoCl) has been convicted by a court of the
United States or of a Sta'te or any political
subdivision thereof of a felony, or
(2) has been discharged from the Armed
Forces under dishonorable conditions, or
C3) has been adjudged by a court of the
United States or of a State or any political
subdivision thereof of being mentally incom·
petent, or
C4) having been a citizen of the United
States has renounced his citizenship. or
C5 > being an alien is illegally or unlawfully
in the United States,
and who, in the course of such employment, receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or
affecting commerce, after the date of the enact.
ment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more·
than two yea.rs, or both.
(c) Definitions

As used in this title-

.
"commerce" means travel, trade. traffic,
commerce, transportation, or communication
among the several States, or between the Dis·
trict of Columbia and any State, or between
any foreign country or any territory or pos·
session and any State or the District of Columbia, or between points in the same State
but through any other State or the District
of Columbia or a foreign co\intry;
(2) "felony" means any offense punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year, but does not include any offense Cother
than one involving a firearm or explosive)
classified as a misdemeanor under the laws of
Cl)
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a State and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less;
. (3) "firearm" means any weapon <including
a starter gun) which will or is designed to or
may readily be converted to expel a. projectile
by the action of an explosive; the frame or re. ceiver of any such weapon; or any firearm
mUffler or firearm silencer; or any destructive
device. Such term shall include any handgun,
rifle, or shotgun;
(4) "destructive device" means any exPlOsive. incendiary, or poison gas bomb, grenade,
mine, rocket, missile, or similar device; and includes any type of weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel
a projectile by the action of any explosive and
having any barrel with a bore of one-half
inch or more in diameter;
CS> "handgun" means any pistol or revolver
originally designed to be fired by the use of a.
single hand and which is designed to fire or
capable of firing fixed cartridge ammunition,
or any other firearm originally designed to be
fired by the use of a single hand;
(6) "shotgun" means a weapon designed or
redesigned, made or remade, and intended to
be fired from the shoulder and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the
energy of the explosive in a fixed shotgun
shell to fire through a smooth bore either a
number of ball shot or a single projectile for
each single pull of the trigger;
<7> "rifle" means a weapon designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be
fired from the shoulder and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the energy
of the explosive in a fixed metallic cartridge
to fire only a single projectile through a
rifled bore for each single pull of the trigger.
<As amended Pub. L. 90-618. title m.
§ 301Ca)C2), Cb), Oct. 22, 1968. 82 Stat. 1236.>

Date of enactment of this Act, referred to in subsea:_-_<a> and Cb) means June 19, 1968, the date of en.a.ctrnent"
of Pub. L. 90-351.
.. ,~
This title, referred to in subsec. Cc), means title Vll·~
of Pub. L. 90-351, which is classified to sections 1201 to.::·
1203 of this Appendix.
·i~lt
AKENDMENTS
·:~;.
1968--Subsec. <a><2>. Pub. L. 90-618, § 30l<a>C2), ~~
stituted "dishonorable" for "other tha.n honorable". ·"'~,
Subsec. <b>C2>. Pub. L. 90-618, § 30Ha><2>. substituted.--?
"dishonorable" for "other than honorable".
·
Subsec. <c>C2>. Pub. L. 90-618, § 30l<b>, restricteS--:::
definition of the term "felony" so as not to inclUde- .
any offense <other than one involving a firearm or ez.·:-:
plosive> classified as a misdemeanor under the laWs Of''·
a state and punishable by a term of imprisonment Of .• two yea.rs or less.
.:.~-.
~~~~.....-

EP'FEcnvE DATE OF 1968 AMENDMENT

-~~

Amendment by section 301<&)(2) of Pub. L. 90-618~
effective June 19, 1968, see section 302 o! Pub. L. ~~
618, set out as an Eflective Date of 1968 Amendment~~
note under section 1201 of this Appendix.
'!
§ 1203. Exemptions

This title shall not apply to-

,,.,,._-.. .

any prisoner who by reason of duties.connected with law enforcement has exp~ ..ly been entrusted with a firearm by compe:~·
tent authority of the prison; and
<2> any person who has been pardoned by~
the President of the United States or the .
chief executive of a State and has exp~
been authorized by the President or such
chief executive, as the case may be, to receive.
possess, or transport in commerce a firearm.
Cl)

REFERENCES IN

TEX'?

This title, ref erred to in text, means title vn of Pub. ·
L. 90-351, which is classified to sections 1201 to 1203 of ·

this Appendix.
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